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DOES SET THEORY REALLY GROUND ARITHMETIC
TRUTH?
ALFREDO R. FREIRE
Abstract. We consider the foundational relation between arith-
metic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of
standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic
truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the
incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syn-
tactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow
us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model in-
terpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that the
relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can re-
sist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion
of arithmetic ‘truth’ provided by the interpretation in a set the-
ory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation
of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted
version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This
theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defin-
ing the coordination problem. The problem can be summarized as
follows. We consider two independent communities of mathemati-
cians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How
likely are they to be coordinated regarding PA’s interpretation in
ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not
interpretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that the
probability of a random extension of arithmetic being interpretable
in ST is zero.
1. Introduction
In this article we study the idea of reducing Arithmetic to Set theory
as a strategy for grounding arithmetic truth. The method of reduction
we have in mind is interpretation. A brief discussion about this
method will be provided in the next section. All proofs provided in this
article are elementary. Our purpose is to raise questions and suggest an
different view of this situation, rather then hard mathematical results.
Definition 1. An interpretation of LT1 in LT2 is a mapping I of
formulas of LT1 in LT2 such that:
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If α,β ∈ LT1 and P is a n’ary predicate in LT1, then the transforma-
tion ∗ is such that
(1) à¬αç∗ = ¬α∗.
(2) àα ∨ βç∗ = α∗ ∨ β∗.
(3) P ∗ is a fixed formula of T2 with at most n free variables.
(4) à∀xàαçç∗ = ∀xàUàxç → α∗ç, being U a fixed formula
with one free variable in T2.
Being x1, x2, . . . , xn all free variables occurring in α,àαçI = Uàx1ç ∧Uàx2ç ∧ . . . ∧Uàxnç→ α∗
We say I is an interpretation of the theory T1 in the theory T2 if for
every theorem ϕ of T1, the formula ϕI is a theorem of T2.
We start our investigation by studying the capability of models to
provide grounds for a theory. Even though our conceptualization of
models is such that each formula is either satisfied or not by a given
model, our ability to determine which option is the case is limited. The
reason is that if the only thing we know about V is that it satisfies ZF,
then we can determine that V ⊧ ϕ if, and only if, ZF ⊢ ϕ.
This is the reason why we may consider models as their syntactical
representation via interpretations. Each model definable in a given base
model V ⊧ ZF can be said be to the result of bounding the elements
of V to a given interpretation I. By doing so, we can keep in mind
our limited knowledge of the models. Since, if M is definable in V (i.e
M = IV ) and we do not know any other information about V other
than it satisfies ZF, then
(1) We know M ⊧ ϕ if, and only if, ZF ⊢ ϕI
Further, we investigate the grounding relation represented by inter-
preting PA in ZF. Notably, the standard interpretation expands what
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may be considered true for arithmetic – i.e. many independent formu-
las in PA become theorems as we see them in ZF through the inter-
pretation. We show that this expansion occurs for any well-founded
interpretation between PA and ZF.
Theorem 1. Every well founded interpretation I of a recursive exten-
sion A of PA in an extension S of ZF is such that there is an unde-
cidable formula ϕ in A that is interpreted as theorem in S under the
interpretation.
But, even though we expect that interpretations of PA in ZF expand
arithmetical truth, an extension of ZF does not completely decide on
arithmetical formulas:
Theorem 2. For any recursive extension S of ZF and any interpreta-
tion I (for instance, the standard interpretation) there is an arithmeti-
cal formula that S does not decide under the interpretation.
At any stage in the development of ZF (a recursive extension), the
concept of arithmetical truth will still be open. This is a consequence of
the theorem 2, as some arithmetic formulas will be undecidable under
the interpretation in the extended set theory. Hence it is possible to
build two structures satisfying the set theory that disagree about the
truth value of an arithmetic formula.
It is due to this phenomena that we consider what I call the co-
ordination problem: consider that there are two groups of math-
ematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms. The first will
decide over axioms for arithmetic and the second for set theory. How
should we consider the relation between the two groups? Note that if
we consider that the arithmetic group should conform to any develop-
ment provided by the set theory group, it becomes hard to see in what
sense the interpretation of arithmetic into set theory have any foun-
dational role. This framework is indistinguishable from simply taking
arithmetic to live in set theory.
Therefore, it is important to consider the possibility of the coordina-
tion between the two theories to break. Is it possible that an extension
of arithmetic not to be interpretable in any extension of a given exten-
sion of set theory? We show this is the case with the result:
Theorem 3. For any recursive extension A of PA and given that S is
an extension of ZF, there is a extension A+ of A that is not interpretable
in S.
Theorem 4. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the probability
that a random consistent extension of a S-standard version of PA is
interpretable in S is zero.
It is indeed possible to generate the extension A+ for any given S.
But, how likely is it to be the case? If we consider that any consistent
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extension of arithmetic is equally likely at any stage in the development
of the arithmetical group, then the probability that a development of
arithmetic is interpretable in a given extension of ZF is zero.
2. The standard model of arithmetic
The strategy of offering set theoretical models for describing ob-
jects of a theory comes from the works of Tarski, Mostowsky, and
Robinson in the 1940s [13]. Ever since this date, mathematicians and
philosophers often resort to this strategy. It is generally accepted that
once we start talking about models, we put aside the formal aspects
of the mathematical subject and start talking about its objects and
truths. Nevertheless, because of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and
Lo¨wenhein-Skolem theorem, there is no formal way to fix the model
of any recursive extension of Peano arithmetic. It is impossible to
say that the only model that satisfies our descriptions of arithmetic is
the intended model, no matter how extensively we describe arithmetic.
Still, using a set theoretical apparatus, we can describe the intended
model as N = ∐ω,+, .,0, s˜ (called the standard model). We can then
show that a set theory like ZF is expressive enough to define a truth
predicate for this interpretation.
The literature on this subject generally presents two approaches for
fixing the standard model: (i) one should offer extra-logical (or second-
order) reasons for choosing N from the myriad possible models for
arithmetic; (ii) one should abandon the model-theoretical construction
and find other ways to ground arithmetic truth. A renewed version of
(ii) can be seen in Gabbay’s defense of a new kind of formalism [5];
Moreover, others may abandon a privileged emphasis on N , because
we must focus on mathematical practice (Ferreiro´s [2]) or because we
must commit ourselves to a realistic multiverse (Hamkins [6]). Still,
differences of opinion are more common as to how and why we should
follow project (i). Those like Williamson [14] argue for metaphysical
reasons for setting N , others like Maddy [10], Quine [12] or Putnam
[11] advocate ways to naturalize the reasons for N . Finally, a recent
approach grounds N in the mathematical practice using a normative
basis in place of the Platonist commitment with N [4].
The question of the adequacy of N is often overlooked. The assump-
tion behind this is that if something is a model of arithmetic, then it
is N . We may not know why this is the intended model or even deny
that such a model exists, but conformity to N is hardly questioned.
However, presenting N as an object without further consideration is a
category mistake. Notably, a similar category mistake would be to say
that ‘it has been two sun revolutions since so and so’. The phrase ‘two
sun revolutions’ is used as quantity of time, even though it describes
a movement in reference to the sun. Hence, the statement would be
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a category mistake unless an implicity reference to Earth is assumed
– and not Mars, for instance. Precisely stated, N is an interpretation
of PA in the language of membership. It represents therefore a con-
struction of objects for arithmetic in terms of objects of a given set
theory. Hence, it is only when we fix the objects for a set theory that
the objects expressed in the construction N gain life. This idea is what
we call from now on relative grounding.
For any given model of set theory V ⊧ ZF , the interpretation N
can be understood as a procedure for obtaining a model N for PA.
The model N = ∐Obj,+, .,0, s˜ is build from the interpretation N =∐U,f+, f., fs,Zero˜ as follows:
(1) Obj = òx ∈ V ⋃ V ⊧ Uàxçù.
(2) 0N = a such that V ⊧ Zeroàaç.
(3) +N = ò∐x, y, z˜ ⋃ x, y, z ∈ Obj and V ⊧ f+àx, yç = zù.
(4) .N = ò∐x, y, z˜ ⋃ x, y, z ∈ Obj and V ⊧ f.àx, yç = zù.
(5) sN = ò∐x, y˜ ⋃ x, y ∈ Obj and V ⊧ fsàxç = yù.
Our idea is to insist on the incomplete picture of the set theoretical
representation of arithmetic. We note that V suffers from the same
problem as N , for it is based in a incomplete theory ZF. Therefore, the
picture of arithmetic obtained from reducing PA to V by N may also
be incomplete.
So to what are we committing in case we say N is the standard model
of arithmetic? It seems like the single construction for the intended
model of arithmetic is based on the idea condensed in the sentence:
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“no matter which model of set theory one is assuming, the model of
arithmetic would be given by N”. Indeed, the picture provided by the
literature is that of revisable truth for set theory and arithmetic – but
unrevisable reduction of arithmetic in set theory. In the next sections,
we argue that for taking the standard model to have a foundational
role one should assume the interpretation to be revisable. For now,
we consider the characterization of arithmetic in set theory in more
details.
2.1. Foundational characterization of PA in ZF. Being N the
standard interpretation of arithmetic in ZF, we call the set AZFN = òϕ ⋃
ZF ⊢ ϕNù the expansion of arithmetic truth under the interpretation.
Indeed some undecidable formulas ϕ of PA are ‘true’ in the standard
model (ZF ⊢ ϕN). This is the case for the Go¨del formula, Goodstein’s
theorem and many others. We will thus consider more broadly the
question of expansion of arithmetic truth from interpretations in set
theories.
Given that I is an interpretation of an arithmetic A in a set theory
S and ThàAç = òϕ ⋃ A ⊢ ϕù, we expect to have ThàAç ⫋ ASI ⫋
Arithmetic truth, as we see in the figure:
A ⊢ α S ⊢ αI
Arithmetic
Truth
We start considering the expansion of arithmetic truth in case we
have a well founded interpretation.
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Definition 2. Let x < y be the arithmetical relation ∃zàz ≠ 0∧x+z =
yç. The interpretation I of an arithmetic A in a set theory S is well
founded if S proves that (i) for every subset x of UI , there is a <-
minimal element in x and that (ii) for every y, òz ⋃ z < yù is a set.
Theorem 1. Let A be a consistent recursive extension of PA and S
a consistent extension of ZF. We further assume that there is a well
founded interpretation I of A in S. Then there is a formula ϕ which is
undecidable in A such that S ⊢ ϕI . In other words, arithmetical truth
is expanded under the interpretation I of A in S.
Proof. Kaye and Wong prove that PA is bi-interpretable with finite set
theory (ZFfin) in [9]
1. Since PA is bi-interpretable with ZFfin, there
is a recursive extension S′ of ZFfin bi-interpretable by B with A. Lets
suppose S is conservative for A under the interpretation I:
(2) S ⊢ ϕI if, and only if, A ⊢ ϕ
Then we can obtain an interpretation J of S′ in S such that
(3) S ⊢ ϕJ if, and only if, S′ ⊢ ϕ
Since the bi-interpretation B is well founded and I is well founded,
J is also well founded. Thus, by Mostowski collapse, we have J is
isomorphic with the interpretation ∐M, ∈˜ with M a transitive class.
We note that M ⊆ Vω in S, for otherwise we would have an infinite
member a. In turn, this implies in S′ the contradiction ⋃òrankàxç ⋃
x ∈ aù is inductive.
1To understand this proof, it is sufficient to know that T1 and T2 are bi-
interpretable if (i) both theories interpret each other and (ii) the composition of the
interpretation is equivalent to an identity interpretation. An extensive treatment
of the bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theories can be found in [7].
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Notably, as S′ is consistent, Vω satisfies the predicate ConàS′ç. It
follows that S ⊢ ConVωàS′ç. But this is absurd, for it would imply
the contradiction S′ ⊢ ConàS′ç. Therefore, the statement (2) is
false. As A ⊢ ϕ implies S ⊢ ϕI by the interpretation, there is a formula
γ such that S ⊢ γI and γ is undecidable in A. 
Another venue to consider the problem is to guarantee that the sys-
tem S realizes whether it is or not an expansion of A under the inter-
pretation.
Proposition 1. Let A be a consistent recursive extension of PA and
S a consistent extension of ZF. We further assume that there is a
recursive process δ definable in S that enumerates formulas that satisfies
S ⊢ ϕI implies A ⊢ ϕ. Then there is a formula ϕ which is undecidable
in A such that S ⊢ ϕI .
Proof. Take ϕ such that PA ⊬ ¬ϕ, then PA ∪ òϕù is consistent from
completeness theorem in S. Thus, for S ⊢ ConàPAç, any finite ex-
tension PA + ϕ is such that S ⊢ ConàPA + ϕç. Further, for A is a
recursive extension of PA, we have that any finite subset ∆ of A is such
that S ⊢ Conà∆ç. So S ⊢ ConàAç from compactness theorem.
DOES SET THEORY REALLY GROUND ARITHMETIC TRUTH? 9
Lets suppose I is an interpretation of A in S and further that
(4) S ⊢ ϕI if, and only if, A ⊢ ϕ.
Thus, from the enumeration δ, we may internalize the argument in (4)
as S ⊢ /à4ç] – since the enumeration of the converse is given by
the interpretation.
We note that (4) implies ConàAç ↔ ConàSç. So, by also in-
ternalizing this argument in S, we obtain
(5) S ⊢/à4ç]→àConàAç↔ ConàSçç.
From Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, we have that S ⊬ ConàSç.
Therefore
(6) S ⊬/à4ç]
And this is a contradiction.
Thus the equation 4 is false. However, we know that A ⊢ ϕ implies
S ⊢ ϕI from the interpretation. We conclude that there is a formula
undecidable ϕ in A such that S ⊢ ϕI . 
A complete answer to the problem is still open. Is it possible to
build an interpretation of recursive and consistent extensions S and A
such that there is an interpretation of A in S preserving A’s truth? We
believe not. And the results presented indicate that this may not be
possible.
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We have seen that interpretations of arithmetic in set theories gen-
erally expand what may be taken to be arithmetical truth (ThàAç ⫋
ASI ). Yet this expansion is not necessarily complete (A
S
I = arithmetic
truth). A confusion in this regard is due to the idea that model con-
structions in set theories offer venues for defining truth for interpreted
theories. Each interpretation I represents the appropriate model con-
struction such that the grounding set theory can provide the notion of
satisfaction I ⊧ ϕ for any formula. Eventually, we would have that for
any formula γ, either I ⊧ γ or I ⊧ ¬γ. However, a more syntactical
approach make it clear that this is simply the expression of the ex-
cluded middle. Indeed, “either I ⊧ γ or I ⊧ ¬γ” should be syntactically
represented by the trivial theorem
(7) ZF ⊢ γI ∨ ¬γI
Instead, what is really wanted is a notion like
(8) ZF ⊢ γI or ZF ⊢ ¬γI
As we suppose a base model V for ZF, we are at hand with a inter-
pretation for ZF itself. In this case, the notion of truth in a model is
represented by “either IV ⊧ γ or IV ⊧ ¬γ”. However, if our supposition
of a model V is not informed by any specific information other than
V ⊧ ZF , the interpretation works simply as the identity. Therefore,
we return to the problem of establishing a notion as in (8).
Nonetheless, (8) is not achievable for any recursive extension of ZF:
Theorem 2. There are formulas α ∈ LPA that are undecidable under
any given interpretation I for any given recursive extension S of ZF.
Proof. To prove this result we should reinternalize the provability pred-
icate under the interpretation. Indeed, if we consider the theory A =òϕ ⋃ S ⊢ ϕIù, the statement “x is an axiom” becomes a semi-recursive
predication. Thus it seems that we would not be able to internalize a
truth predicate for this new theory.
The point is that we should not internalize the predicate directly for
the theory A. Instead, we note that
(1) “x is a proof in S” is recursive.
(2) “x is I of a formula in A” is recursive.
Thus
(3) “x is a proof in S that ends with I of the y in A” is recursive.
DOES SET THEORY REALLY GROUND ARITHMETIC TRUTH? 11
We call Pràx, yç the representation of the last statement in A.
Moreover, this is the specific proof predicate from which we con-
struct the desired provability predicate used in Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem. Thus, by applying Rosser’s trick and the diagonal lemma, we
obtain a formula G that is undecidable in A. Therefore G is undecidable
under the interpretation I in the ZF extension S.2 
This theorem can be understood as a small extension of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem as we consider decidability under relations be-
tween theories. Moreover, it relates to results available in Satisfaction
is not absolute [8]. In this article, Hamkins and Yang considered the
idea that there may be arithmetical formulas ρ that two models of ZF
disagree – even as these same models agree on what is the standard
model for arithmetic. Although very insightful on interesting model
constructions, it lacks a construction for the ρ formula. This formula
is obtained as the existential for a number representing a formula. In
fact, exhibiting ρ is not possible, for it would imply the inconsistency
of ZF.
Put another way, we have shown a similar phenomena where the
disagreement can be exhibited. To make it possible we considered a
foundational view that accommodate our incomplete understanding of
set theory and arithmetic. Thus, agreement about arithmetic is to be
understood as having similar sets of arithmetical truths òϕ ⋃ S ⊢ ϕNù,
being S some stage (or alternative stage) in the development of ZF.
In this sense, there is a formula ρ that would be true in some possible
development of S and false in some other possible development of S.
3. The coordination problem
Lets consider the following fictional scenario for the development of
set theory and arithmetic. There are two group of mathematicians that
would decide about new axioms for set theory and arithmetic. The first
one Gs is responsible for set theory and the second Ga for arithmetic.
Lets further assume that Ga agrees with the standard expansion of
arithmetic in ZF (AZFN is considered valid for Ga). How should we
frame the relation between the two groups?
Consider that Gs have decided in favor of new axiom A to set theory
ZF. Notably, this would expand the set of arithmetic truth in AZF+AN .
2As indicated by Rodrigo Freire, this same result can be obtained by simply ap-
plying Craig’s theorem on recursively enumerable sets of formulas being recursively
axiomatizable [1].
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Should Ga consider this new set to be true? This being the general
attitude towards arithmetic means that the standard reduction deter-
mine new truths for arithmetic. In what sense does, thus, the standard
interpretation provides a foundation for new arithmetical truths? If
we think the standard interpretation does this, it seems like we have
simply assumed that arithmetic lives in set theory, without any fur-
ther considerations. After all, this framework bounds the expansion of
arithmetic truth to the expansion of set theoretic truth. Therefore, Ga
would have no authority over new arithmetic axioms after all.
In order to make room for this setting, one should consider that
we have a better understanding on how arithmetic is reduced to set
theory than we have for each of the theories. And, for this to work in
general, we should consider the reduction of arithmetic in set theory
unrevisable.
Very often we consider ourselves to have a good understanding on
relations between things that we may not have a good understanding.
This is the case between the translation of a sentence like “Napoleon
was an emperor”. We may have lots of doubts about the ontological
status of the words used in this sentence and still be confident about
how to translate it to Chinese.
Indeed, we may be more confident about the way we reduce arith-
metic to set theory than about truth in those theories. Yet this is not
sufficient to assume the unrevisability of the reduction relation. After
some investigation over the concept of emperor, one has realized that
the standard translation of emperor in Chinese does not really repre-
sents what English speakers refer as emperor. For instance, emperor
is usually translated as ‘Huangdi’ in Chinese, even though this word
associate the monarch with his divinity. In English, although often
associated with divinity, the word emperor can be used without divine
association. So a more intricate description as ‘Napoleon was the non-
divine man who ruled over the French empire’ would be better (even
if it is not practical).
If there are grounds for taking N to be a privileged interpretation,
those would be based on partial representations of arithmetic and set
theory. Therefore, the idea that N correctly works as a connection
between the theories may be simply because we haven’t advanced the
theories enough. This would be a similar case if a Chinese working in
the translation of a western modern history book has been translating
‘Emperor’ as ‘Huangdi’. It seems perfectly fine if he believed this to be a
general translation, given that the only time he applied the translation
was for the ‘Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire’. But as he starts
translating the Napoleonic period, the broader picture would force him
to reconsider the generality of the translation.
A different picture would be the case where the Chinese translator
invented a language where w means ‘blue chair’. Finding someone else
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using w to refer to a red chair, he could correctly accuse the person
to be using the word incorrectly. So this would be similar to the case
where we consider arithmetic to be a definition inside set theory. But
this being the case would imply that there is no foundational gain in
studying the relation between the theories.
Whereas set theory has a foundational role for arithmetic, we may
now consider that the standard interpretation is a good yet revisable
set theoretic inspection over arithmetic. It is precisely because we
assume the interpretation to be revisable that a foundational relation
can be argued. As truth expands in both theories we evaluate conflicts
and revise, if necessary, the interpretation to accommodate changes. A
summary of the steps in the coordination of Ga and Gs can be:
(1) Every addition of axioms to one theory should provoke an in-
spection over the adequacy of the current interpretation of arith-
metic in set theory.
(2) If a conflict emerges in the development of the theories, the two
groups should meet to adjust the interpretation to prevent the
conflict.
(3) The adequacy of an interpretation should have reasons for itself
apart from accommodating the interpretation.
As we see in step 2, the two communities should sit together and
reevaluate the state of the reduction, if necessary. Hopefully, these
conferences would hardly occur. But we should allow some indepen-
dence to each group. For otherwise their development, especially on
arithmetic, would turn to be by definition assumed in the development
of the other.
We have added some life to the grounding relation by allowing it
to fail. Nevertheless, there is still a deeper problem. The following
scenario is still possible:
(1) Each instance of the development allows one to fix the interpre-
tation between the theories.
(2) And at least one of the extension of any state of arithmetic is
not possibly interpreted in set theory.
Allowing both of these possibilities weakens the edifice of the ground-
ing relation. Each moment in the development of the theories is an
incomplete stage in which we cannot anticipate the impossibility of re-
ductions occurring further in the development of the theories. From
(1), any addition to the theories allows one to find (or keep) an interpre-
tation of arithmetic. However, from (2), finding those interpretations
do not add to idea that arithmetic is indeed reducible to a given set
theory. This scenario is possible, as we see in the next theorem.
Theorem 3. Let S be a consistent extension of ZF and A an recur-
sive extension of PA, then there is an extension A∗ of A that is not
interpretable in S.
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Proof. We extend the theory A by generating a sequence of theories
that are not interpretable in S by a particular interpretation I. Being
these theories compatible with each other, the union of them will not
be interpretable in S.
Let A0 = A and òI1, I2, . . .ù an enumeration of all interpretations
from the language of PA in the language of ZF. (abbreviation: T
J
≤ T ′
represents “T is interpreted in T ′ by J”)
Ai+1 =
Ai + ¬ϕIi in case Ai Ii≤ S,Ai ⊬ ϕ and S ⊢ ϕIi for some ϕ
Ai +G, otherwise, being G the Go¨del formula for Ai
Let A∗ = ⋃
i∈ω
Ai. We note that A∗ is a consistent extension of A. We
prove that this theory is not interpretable in S.
Suppose A∗ is interpretable by I in S, then I = Ik for some natural
number k. Notably, if a theory T is interpreted in a theory T ′, then
any subtheory of T is interpreted in T ′ by the same interpretation.
Thus the entire sequence of theories òA1,A2, . . .ù is interpreted in S
by Ik. In particular, we have Ak
Ik
≤ S and that Ak+1 = Ai + ¬ϕIi or
Ak+1 = Ak + G as in the definition. In the first case, we obtain the
contradiction S ⊢ ϕIk and S ⊢ ¬ϕIk . In the second, we have either the
contradiction Ak
Ik
≰ S or that, for all α, Ai ⊢ α if, and only if, S ⊢ αI .
But, since Ai ⊬ G, it follows S ⊬ GIk – which, in turn, implies the
contradiction Ak+1
Ik
≰ S. 
We proved that it is possible for the theories ZF and PA to part ways
along the path of development. Although disturbing, this may simply
account for the meaningfulness of the question about the reduction
between the two theories. We have considered that we should conceive
it to fail (even fatally, as in this case) in order to not take for granted
that the reduction works. Note further that this pays tribute to the
idea that by interpreting arithmetic in set theory we should inform
something that was not simply given, i.e., that arithmetic lives in the
realm of set theory. Nonetheless, the following result should challenge
those who are still hopeful that the theories can possibly have a strong
grounding relation:
Theorem 4. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the probability
that a random consistent extension of PA is interpretable in S is zero.
Proof. Lets consider the set Σ of consistent extensions of PA.
From the incompletness theorem, there is a formula G that is unde-
cidable in PA. Thus both PA +G and PA + ¬G are consistent.
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Notably, this is still true for the addition of any finite number of new
axioms α1, α2, . . . , αn. There is a formula G that is undecidable in PA+òα1, α2, . . . , αnù. The process of adding axioms continues indefinitely.
Lets then index extensions with binary numbers in the following way:
(1) A0 = PA.
(2) If G is the Go¨del sentence in Ai, then Ai1 is Ai +G and Ai0 is
Ai + ¬G. (i1 and i0 are the binary extension of the number i
with the digits 1 and 0)
(3) Σ = òAn ⋃ n ∈ ωù is the set of finite extensions of PA.
Note that each member of Σ is a finite extension of PA. Now we
include infinite extensions of PA in Σ. Let Π be a set of ⋃C, for each
C a subset-chain in Σ. The index for the members of àΠ ∖ Σç can
be describe by functions ω Ð→ ò1,0ù. Thus, as a simple consequence,
the set of indexes of the extensions is in bijection with Pàωç.
Each theory with infinite sequences as indexes is indeed a different
theory, for any difference in the sequence means that one theory has a
a formula like G and the other a formula ¬G.
Nonetheless, the number of interpretations is trivially countable.
Also, since the same interpretation cannot accommodate incompatible
theories, there must be a extension of PA that is not interpretable in
the extension S. Moreover, as we are comparing countable possible in-
terpretable extensions with uncountable non-interpretable extensions,
the probability of picking a interpretable extension is zero. 
We note that same can be obtained, even if the starting point in-
cludes all theorems of the set theory S under the interpretation. Indeed,
we can include the theorems under a given interpretation at any point
without interfering in the result.
Corollary 1. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the probability
that a random consistent extension of a S-standard version of PA (òφ ⋃
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S ⊢ φIù, being I the current standard interpretation) is interpretable in
S is zero.
To prove this corollary, we need only to include the result in the
theorem 2 in the strategy of the last theorem.
Although extensions like A+ are in general not interpretable in S,
the process of generating these theories is internalizable in S. There-
fore, we may say that S proves the consistency statement for all these
extensions. This is not enough to claim a proper foundational rela-
tion. The model construction emerging from this type of consistency
proof is simply given by the existence of a model as in the Henkin
canonical construction. Thus the foundational model one can generate
provides little more information than saying that the theory is consis-
tent3. Therefore, we should not consider those cases as a path to avoid
the problem discussed in this section.
Lastly, lets consider a metaphor. Picture the situation in which we
have the unstable equilibrium of a sphere on a hill with a very small
slope. We would like to say that the appearence of equilibrium rep-
resents our intuitions about the reduction between the theories being
correct. Indeed, we have put the sphere in a position that appears to
be an equilibrium. As the slope of the hill is very small, our perception
of equilibrium works really well. However, even if it takes a long time,
it will become evident that the interpretation of PA in ZF is not in
equilibrium.
The ideas developed in the present article, especially in theorem
3, bring attention to the fact that we are talking about an unstable
hill. No matter how the sphere appears to be at rest, we know that
eventually it will gain traction and fall. The project of using N for
grounding arithmetic truth is equivalent to finding the equilibrium peak
of the hill. It seems to be a good project as we focus on the movement
of the sphere – but an analysis of the geography of the hill is already
sufficient to conclude this hill to be unstable. We should not base our
foundational investigations in guarantying that we have the correct
interpretation. Instead, we should use the interpretations as it informs
about arithmetic concepts and as it considers bundles of arithmetic
formulas in the very expressive environment of set theory. The standard
interpretation N should not be taken to be the relative grounding
of arithmetic in set theory.
4. Final remarks
Rather than manipulating models of PA, we considered interpreta-
tions of PA in ZF. Our goal was to accommodate the incomplete picture
3A general survey on the kind of information this Henkin model construction
can be viewed in Translating non Interpretable Theories [3].
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of the set theoretical metatheory into our analysis of the foundations of
arithmetic. The ordinal interpretation expands what we may consider
true in arithmetic: many undecidable formulas in PA become theorems
when examined under the interpretation in ZF. This is a general phe-
nomenon. For every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions
of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has
more theorems than the original. This shows that studying arithmetic
inside set theory can be significant. As one consider these interpreta-
tions, one is exploring the expansion of arithmetic truth and how the
addition of bundles of axioms play out.
We continued by introducing the coordination problem. We consid-
ered two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for
deciding over new axioms of ZF and PA. Using this setting, we stud-
ied the possibility of coordinating PA with PA’s interpretation in ZF.
Nonetheless, we proved that it is possible to have extensions of PA
not interpretable in a given set theory ST. Moreover, we considered a
given recursive extension A of PA and supposed any extension of this
theory to be equally likely. Here, we prove that the probability for an
extension A be interpretable in ST is zero.
We have, therefore, set a framework to criticize the notion of ground-
ing between theories such as arithmetic and set theory. However, this is
not to be understood as a general criticism of the idea of using set the-
ory to investigate foundational matters regarding arithmetic. Instead,
we have soley shown that it may be flawed to assume that set theory
really provide grounds for arithmetic truth or a definitive description
of the universe of numbers. Our suggestion is therefore to consider a
foundational relation that aims primarily at conceptional clarification
of the concepts involved in the studied theory. An expressively rich en-
vironment such as set theory is armed with tools to study arithmetical
relations in wider settings than it would be possible without leaving its
deductive apparatus.
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